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This study investigated the mechanisms behind false memories in phonological 
associates using prior recall and confusable words. We looked primarily at the predictions of 
activation monitoring processes (Roediger, Balota & Watson, 2001) and fuzzy trace accounts 
(Brainerd and Reyna, 2002) of false memory. In addition, we also looked at the relationships 
between working memory, recall, and recognition through the use of digit span tasks (both 
backward and forward) and the operation span task. In Experiment 1, initial analyses reported 
a significant contribution of confusability for false recognition. However, further 
investigations revealed that confusability did not interact with prior recall. Results indicated 
that unrecalled critical items were more likely to be falsely recognised than previously 
recalled critical items. Experiment 2 showed similar results and provided additional insights 
through the use of the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985). There were more 
remember judgments for previously recalled words than unrecalled words for studied items, 
but there were no significant differences between remember and know judgments for critical 
items in both previously recalled and unrecalled conditions. The relationship between the 
working memory measures, and recall and recognition was inconclusive with conflicting 
results for Experiment 1 and 2. However, the effect of prior recall was consistent across both 
experiments and suggests that the pattern of results found here is more supportive of fuzzy 
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False memory research has contributed numerous and significant advances towards 
understanding how we remember events in our lives. The evidence gathered from false 
memory research helps us discover the fallacies of memory and explore how they are being 
produced in the process of reducing such memory errors. This present research focuses on a 
more specific problem: the role of prior recall in affecting false memories. Prior recall in this 
case refers to items that were previously recalled during a recall task. The question brought 
up during our experiments would be whether prior recall will lead to the creation of more 
false memories. In the course of examining the role of prior recall, we would also hope to 
establish whether we can separate the two main theoretical accounts for the creation of false 
memories.  
The two theoretical accounts, namely activation/monitoring theory (Roediger, Balota 
& Watson, 2001) and fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd and Reyna, 2002) will be discussed in the 
following pages, in the hopes of clarifying the distinction between these two accounts while 
also understanding that these two theories may not be entirely different from each another. 
The work presented here will look at phonological associates rather than semantic associates 
which have been studied extensively in past research involving false memories. We wish to 
use these phonological associates to fully extend these theoretical based accounts and help 
forward the idea that false memories can be consistently created using phonological 




The relationship between prior recall and false memory is not an entirely new 
concept, but what is unique here is that we would try to use confusability measures of 
phonological associates to help further our investigations for prior recall and whether prior 
recall is an appropriate measure to dissociate between activation/monitoring views and fuzzy 
trace views. The concept of confusability for phonological associates was first introduced by 
Sommers and Lewis (1999) and would be discussed in detail later in this section, and 
provides the framework for our present research. In addition, we would also briefly look at 
explicit working memory measures in this study and see whether such measures are suitable 
in teasing apart the two views. The body of work involving individual differences and false 




The Deese/Roediger/McDermott (DRM) Paradigm 
The present experiments are closely related to a seminal study by Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) who adapted the work of Deese (1959) who first created the paradigm in 
testing false memories. This is commonly referred to as the DRM paradigm (Deese, 1959; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and has been extensively used in the study of false memories. 
Participants are initially presented with lists of words that are semantically associated with a 
non-presented word called the critical item. For instance, one list comprised of words such as 
bed, rest, awake, dream, tired, and wake that are associated with the non-presented critical 
item sleep. A free recall task would be given after the presentation of each list. Participants 




the previous example for the critical item sleep, an occurrence of a false recall would be 
when sleep was one of the words for that list recorded by the participant. 
After all lists were presented, participants may then be given a recognition task that 
comprised of a mix of studied words and non-studied words. During this recognition task, 
participants were told to judge each item as either old (if it was presented before) or new (if it 
was not presented before). For instance, the words bed, rest, dream and sleep are presented 
during recognition and if the participant judged sleep, bed and dream to be old, the 
participant would then record a false recognition for the critical item sleep and veridical 
recognition for bed and dream. Results from Experiment 2 in Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) reported that participants had high levels of false recall and false recognition with 
levels that are comparable to that for veridical recall and veridical recognition.  
 
Activation/Monitoring Theory  
Such occurrences of false remembering can be explained theoretically through two 
different accounts. The first account is called the activation/monitoring theory (Roediger, 
Balota & Watson, 2001) that involves associative activation and monitoring processes. 
Associative activation through the Implicit Associative Response (IAR; Underwood, 1965) 
argues that the presentation of the list item activates the word itself as well as partial 
activations for its semantic associates. This idea comes from the assumption that people 
develop a mental lexicon of frequently used words and concepts that are organised 
semantically, with stronger associative bonds with words that are more similar in nature 
versus those that are less similar (Gallo, 2006). Therefore when initially presented with the 
word rest, processing this word would then activate other semantically related words such as 




sufficiently strong due to its associations with presented lists, then the critical item would 
then be falsely remembered to be a true event. Thus, in order for the activation of the critical 
item to be sufficiently strong, the number of associative links to the critical item needs to be 
sufficiently high enough to elicit this activation. Otherwise, the activation of the critical item 
will not occur which will lead to no false memories. 
A few studies have supported this argument through varying the number of associates 
available to elicit the activation of the critical item, or looking at the relationship between the 
presented words and critical item in terms of associative strength. A study by Robinson and 
Roediger (1997) looked at IAR through decreasing the number of associates presented to 
participants. Participants were presented with study lists varying in list length (3 to 15 
semantic associates per list) and found that with fewer semantic associates, participants were 
less likely to produce false memories for the critical item. Because fewer associates are 
presented to the participants, it is likely that the activations of the few associates for the 
critical item were not sufficient for activating the critical item. In contrast, more semantic 
associates would elicit a higher activation for the critical item which would then be 
mistakenly regarded as a true memory. 
Findings from two other studies also found evidence to support IAR in terms of 
associative strength. For instance, Deese (1959) showed that backward associative strength 
(BAS; the associative strength between list words and critical item) was significantly 
correlated with false recall where lists that generate the critical item more often will also be 
more likely to generate false recall. Similarly, Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo 
(2001) used multiple regression analysis and found BAS to be the strongest predictor of false 
recall or false recognition on a later test. Both these studies allow for the assumption that the 




impression that the critical item was actually presented. Therefore, the stronger the BAS, the 
higher the likelihood a person would falsely recall or falsely recognise a critical item. 
However, activation alone is insufficient to account for false memories. Participants 
are also able to reduce memory errors through a more conscious editing process called 
monitoring. In one study, McDermott and Watson (2001) looked at veridical and false recall 
data at five different presentation rates of 20, 250, 1000, 3000, and 5000 ms per word. As 
presentation durations increased, veridical recall also increased. However, at the longer 
presentation durations (1000/3000/5000 ms), false recall decreased suggesting that when 
participants are given more time to encode information, they are able to use monitoring 
strategies and reduce memory errors. Studies on age differences also point toward monitoring 
strategies being employed where older adults were found to remember fewer studied words 
but falsely remembered more critical items when compared to younger adults (Balota et al., 
1999). Such evidence directs the possibility that the ability to monitor information is critical 
for avoiding false memories.  
 
Fuzzy Trace Theory  
The second theoretical explanation for false memories involves the fuzzy trace theory 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2002) which proposes that both verbatim and gist traces are encoded in 
parallel at the time of study. Verbatim traces reflect specific memories of individual items, 
whereas gist traces represent the general meaning or theme of the stimuli. For instance, if 
items like bed and rest was presented and were recalled, these would be regarded as verbatim 
responses. However, if pillow was recalled instead this would have been regarded as a gist 




Thus, veridical memory of presented items reflects a representation of verbatim traces 
while false memory of the critical item is primarily driven by gist traces. According to 
Seamon et al. (2003), the use of multiple study-test trials may increase veridical recall and 
recognition, and reduce false recall and recognition. In their study, they introduced four 
encoding conditions which had participants either hear the word lists, writing the words as 
they were presented, writing the second letter of each word as it was presented, or write 
numbers while the words are presented. In their Experiment 1, participants underwent five 
study-test trials and had a free recall test at the end of each trial. Regardless of the encoding 
condition, veridical recall increased over trials. However, false recall was reduced in the 
conditions where participants focused their attention on the words. This suggests that some 
memory editing process might have occurred. Their Experiment 2 replaced free recall with 
recognition, and found similar results. The authors concluded that encoding strategies, 
attention and practice may influence veridical and false memory differently for both recall 
and recognition. As described earlier, verbatim traces are representations of specific 
memories and with multiple study-test trials participants would be able to strengthen these 
verbatim representations and are more likely to rely on them more than gist representations. 
Although encoded in parallel at the time of study, the gist representations that are driven by 
the general theme of the lists would now have to take a backseat as the verbatim traces are 
strong enough to allow reproduction of the material previously learned. Therefore, when 
participants are made more aware of the actual content of the lists they are more likely to be 
better at rejecting items that were not presented. On another hand, if participants are unable to 
access these verbatim representations they would then try to use gist representations to drive 
their responses. Participants would not be consciously aware of the items that were presented 
due to the lack of verbatim representations, but rather rely on the sense of familiarity through 




memory editing process that may reduce the occurrence of false memory when there are 
sufficient verbatim representations to allow us to reject items that were not presented.  
In another study, Carneiro et al. (2012) investigated a similar editing strategy 
(identify-to-reject) which incorporates the idea that if participants are able to recall studied 
items more easily, it allows them to later reject a related critical item on a recognition test. 
According to fuzzy trace theory, the retrieval of the verbatim trace of a studied item allows 
for a comparison between the studied item and the test probe during the recognition phase. 
For instance, the studied item bed and the non-presented critical item sleep were presented 
during the recognition phase. If the presented lists contained non-semantic associates, 
participants may be able to recognise the word bed which was presented earlier, but not sleep 
which is rejected through the feeling of familiarity. Participants reject the word sleep because 
they realise the similarity between sleep and the studied item, bed, while understanding that 
the presented list contained items that were not semantically associated with each other. 
Following this argument, the critical item would therefore be rejected if the verbatim trace for 
the studied item allows for a mismatch to occur with the critical item. The authors further 
argue that gist traces can also be used to lower the incidence of false memories through the 
idea of theme identifiability where the theme of the list may or may not be easily interpreted 
through its strongest associates.  
A list with high identifiability would be one where participants would be able to 
produce the critical item for that particular list easily compared to a low identifiability list 
where it would be harder for participants to produce the critical item. For instance, a high 
identifiability list would be one associated with the critical item cinema, while a low 
identifiability list would be one associated with the critical item cold. These identifiability 
lists used in Carneiro et al. (2012) were created in a normative study done prior to this (see 




word that best incorporates the theme of the presented lists. Results from this normative study 
indicated that participants consistently agreed that the list associated with the critical item 
cinema is high identifiable.  
It is proposed that when the critical item comes to mind during the study phase, 
recollection rejection can occur when participants are aware that the critical item was not 
presented. In lists of high identifiability, participants would be more likely to figure out the 
critical item for the list and deflate the possibility for false memories to occur. For low 
identifiability lists, participants would have a harder time identifying the gist and this would 
lead to a much higher incidence of false memories. Although this pattern of results is suited 
for future exploration especially when taking into consideration its possible indication for 
support in fuzzy trace theory, the idea of identifiability will not be the focus in this study. By 
making the gist more apparent compared to associative activation, the question here would be 
whether it is possible for us to fully isolate the central theme of a list from associative 
strength. Before we can allow speculative arguments regarding this question, we need to look 
upon the creation of false memories through non-semantic means and the method that 
Sommers and Lewis (1999) used to investigate false memory phenomena.  
 
Phonological False Memories 
All of these studies previously mentioned rely mainly on the use of semantic lists in 
the understanding of false memories but recently more work has been published using a 
hybrid of semantic/phonological lists (e.g. Watson, Balota & Roediger, 2003; Watson, Balota 
& Sergent-Marshall, 2001; Ballou & Sommers, 2008). These bodies of work using hybrid 
lists have shown similar and consistent support for phonological false memories like their 




used solely phonological associates in their study and found similar results to what was 
originally found in Roediger and McDermott (1995). This proved to be an important finding 
when accounting for the theoretical bases for false memories. The two theories previously 
discussed should apply to non-semantic associates as well, and not only for semantic 
associates. In their argument, Sommers and Lewis (1999) postulated that the IAR process can 
be compared to the Neighbourhood Activation Model (NAM; Luce & Pisoni, 1998). The 
NAM proposes to explain phonological associations between list items and critical items and 
is not unlike the IARs for semantic associates. According to the NAM, words are organised 
in similarity neighbourhoods where items that are phonologically similar to a target word are 
situated within the same neighbourhood. Words in this neighbourhood are created from a 
target word through the addition, deletion or substitution of a single phoneme. For example, 
words such as hat, bat, cot, and cab would be placed in the similarity neighbourhood for the 
word cat. Word lists created from these neighbourhoods could increase the activation levels 
for the critical item, thus increasing the likelihood of false memory. To create these lists, 
phonological similarity was assessed using the frequency-weighted neighbour probability 
(FWNP; Luce & Pisoni, 1998) metric. Sommers and Lewis (1999) first used confusion 
matrices (Luce, 1986) to assess the probabilities where misidentifying an individual phoneme 
from the critical item can occur with the corresponding phoneme in the associated neighbour. 
For instance, to calculate the similarity between the critical item cat and one of its associates, 
cot, one of the probabilities of misidentifying the medial phoneme /æ/ from cat and // from 
cot is obtained from confusion matrices. Similarly, for the word kit, the individual 
probabilities of misidentifying the first and medial phonemes would be calculated. These 
individual probabilities would then be multiplied by a log transformation of its word 




Using these lists, they investigated the possibility that phonological associates may act 
in a similar manner as semantic associates through the DRM paradigm. Participants were 
presented lists of words phonologically associated with a critical item, and were given either 
a free recall task or an arithmetic task at the end of each list. Once all lists were presented, 
participants were given a recognition task. The pattern of results found in their Experiment 1 
for false recall and false recognition for phonological associates were similar for results 
observed for semantic associates in Roediger and McDermott (1995). Thus, for a list of 
phonological associates such as hat, bat, cob, and cab with an associated critical item, cat, a 
false recall would occur if a participant were to write down the word cat in the list of recalled 
words for this particular list. The recall data from Experiment 1 in Sommers and Lewis 
(1999) showed that the probability of false recall was 54%, comparable to the 55% in 
Experiment 2 in Roediger and McDermott (1995).  
To find theoretical evidence to support their argument, their Experiment 3 
investigated whether the use of confusability would be able to reduce the occurrence of false 
memories. Participants in Experiment 3 were given two sets of confusability lists: the most 
confusable and the least confusable. A most confusable list would be referred to a list where 
the neighbours are most similar to their corresponding critical items, while a least confusable 
list is one where the neighbours are the least similar to their critical items. For example, for 
the critical item cat, its most confusable neighbours would be words such as fat, that, and mat 
and its least confusable neighbours would be kite, pat, and cash. As in Experiment 1, 
participants were presented lists of words followed by a free recall task or arithmetic task 
after each list. After all the lists were presented, a recognition task was then given to 
participants. The results from their Experiment 3 found that least confusable phonological 
associates significantly reduced the occurrence of false memories compared to most 




may account for false memories in phonological associates due to the differences seen in the 
two confusable conditions. For both confusable lists, activations for the individual neighbours 
can sufficiently elicit activation for the corresponding critical item. However, the 
phonological similarity of these neighbours also increases the strength of associative 
responses. Phonologically dissimilar neighbours may provide weaker associative responses to 
the critical item as evident from the false recall and false recognition results from their 
Experiment 3 which showed fewer false recall and recognition for least confusable lists than 
for most confusable lists. 
False memories are typically explored within the context of semantic associations, 
and factors that can influence their production include associative strength, theme 
identifiability and working memory. The use of phonological associates allows us to explore 
false memory phenomena through less typical means which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
    
AIMS OF CURRENT STUDY 
 
The general aim of the research here is to tease apart the two theoretical accounts for 
false memories, and the use of prior recall can help to do this. In addition, we will look at the 
relationship between working memory capacity and false recognition which can also be used 
to investigate the predictions of these two accounts. The scarcity of literature involving 
working memory and false memories and in particular phonological associates invites this 
detailed investigation. This section will elucidate how prior recall and working memory 




Effects of Prior Recall on Subsequent Recognition 
In their discussion, Roediger and McDermott (1995) commented on how items that 
were produced during the recall phase had an effect on recognition results in comparison with 
items that were not produced. This provides an interesting look at how prior correct recall and 
prior false recall has an effect on later recognition. For both previously recalled studied items 
and critical items, the proportion of items being recognised as old were much higher than that 
for items that were not previously recalled. More interestingly, critical items that were not 
falsely produced during recall were later falsely recognised as old at a higher rate than 
studied items that were not produced during recall. Similarly, Sommers and Lewis (1999) 
investigated the effects of prior recall with phonological associates and found only a 
significant main effect of prior recall. This means that the previously recalled studied items 
were more likely to be correctly recognised as old compared to previously unrecalled studied 
items. In addition, there was no significant difference for the proportion of correct items 
recognised as old for the most and least confusable associates. For critical items that were 
falsely recalled earlier, there was also a higher likelihood that these critical items would be 
falsely recognised later. However, they also found an effect for confusability. Least 
confusable associates that were falsely recalled earlier had a lesser likelihood to be falsely 
recognised later as old compared to most confusable associates.  
Taking the results from these two studies, the objective of the investigations here is to 
look at the way phonological associates are being produced at recall and whether this would 
affect later recognition. Of particular interest is the relationship between the previously 
unrecalled items and later recognition. Past research on testing effects had focused on recall 
rather than recognition, where the act of recall may facilitate and make recalled items more 
accessible for later recall tests (McDermott, 1996). The influence of initial recall on later 




Schacter, Verfaellie, and Pradere (1996) found no testing effect for studied items or critical 
items while Payne, Elie, Blackwell and Newschatz (1996) found an effect for studied items 
only and not for critical items. In order to understand how we gather information from 
presented words and critical items, we need to look at how words from presented lists and 
non-presented critical items will elicit recognition responses in a later phase depending on 
whether they were recalled previously. Thus, for this study we will look at two conditions: a 
recalled and unrecalled condition. The recalled condition includes items that were recalled 
previously and later recognised as old, and the unrecalled condition involves items that were 
not recalled earlier but were later recognised as old. By looking at these two conditions, we 
can then tell how participants process the presented lists during the recall phase and their 
subsequent recognition responses will provide useful information to tease apart the two 
theories. 
Using cat as the critical item for the following associates fat, that, and cab, let us 
consider activation/monitoring theory first. According to this theory, when the participant 
recalls fat, that and cab, the participant has a higher probability of recalling cat as well if 
there are sufficient activations from the associates to elicit activation for cat. Thus, we may 
see a false recall of cat in this scenario. Given a subsequent recognition task, there is a higher 
likelihood for the recognition of fat, that, and cab because they have been recalled earlier. 
Similarly, cat may also be falsely recognised following its recall earlier. In sum, an item that 
has been recalled earlier may have a higher tendency to be recognised later according to this 
theory. 
An alternative account that fuzzy trace theory proposes is that these items are 
represented in verbatim and gist traces. Following the earlier example for studied items fat, 
that, and cab, these items are represented as verbatim traces when the participant is able to 




these items and create a gist trace which is the general theme of this list. If the participant 
falsely recalls the critical item cat, this is due to the gist trace rather than verbatim trace. Our 
argument for this theory is that when participants recall the studied words, there is a 
likelihood of them being subsequently recognised due to these verbatim traces. Due to the 
prevalence of the verbatim traces of the studied items, participants may then disregard the 
critical item cat during the recognition task. This follows from the recollection rejection 
argument by Seamon et al. (2003) discussed earlier where the strengthening of verbatim 
traces allows gist traces to be rejected more easily which leads to a lower occurrence of false 
recognition (see also Carneiro et al., 2012). However, when both studied items and critical 
items are not recalled earlier, only gist representations of the list are created which may lead 
to elevated proportions of these items being recognised as old.  
In sum, the differences between these two theories may lie in the false recognition 
responses for the critical items that were previously recalled. Activation/monitoring theory 
predicts that prior recall will lead to a higher proportion of false recognition of critical items 
but fuzzy trace theory predicts the opposite: a lower proportion of false recognition of critical 
items. A more detailed description of the specific experimental hypotheses will be found in 
the next chapter. 
 
Working Memory Capacity 
 A second way of distinguishing between these two theories is to consider 
incorporating working memory and investigate its influence on false recognition. Working 
memory processes affect how individuals encode perceptual and contextual information of an 
event and failure in the encoding process my lead to subsequent failure in discriminating 




memories argue that individuals with higher working memory capacity would be able to 
better monitor and reduce memory errors. This argument stems from an idea that failure in 
source monitoring prevents an individual from differentiating a non-presented item from a 
presented one. Thus, working memory is crucial in playing a strategic role in the process of 
encoding and retrieval of distinct information. This would mean that higher working memory 
capacity would most likely be associated with higher veridical responses than false responses. 
In one study, Peters, Jelicic, Verbeek, and Merckelbach (2007) investigated individual 
differences in working memory capacity and found that participants with poor backward digit 
span scores had higher levels of false recognition. However, no relation with false 
recognition was found for both forward digit span scores and operation span scores1. Another 
study by Watson, Bunting, Poole, and Conway (2005) found a significant relationship 
between poor working memory capacity and false recognition when participants were given a 
warning instruction beforehand. Participants with these instructions were warned that the lists 
they were about to see would elicit false memories for critical words that were not presented 
to them. However, this relationship was only found between operation span scores and false 
recognition where participants with higher operation span scores were able to reduce the 
incidence of false recognition.  
 Although the use of different measures of working memory capacity show somewhat 
discrepant findings, it is important to establish whether individual differences in working 
memory capacity can still influence false memories, especially in the form of phonological 
associates. In particular, activation/monitoring theory will predict that working memory will 
be positively correlated with veridical recall but negatively correlated with false recall. This 
                                                          
1
 Operation span task is a measure of complex working memory capacity as described by 
Turner and Engle (1989), and is used here to look for source monitoring errors. This task will 




follows the idea that a higher working memory capacity allows better monitoring to occur, 
thus reducing false memories (Watson et al., 2005). A person with poor working memory as 
shown with lower scores for the working memory tasks will tend to recall fewer studied 
items. As fewer studied items like hat, bat, and cab are being recalled, the critical item cat 
may then be falsely recalled because participants had created activation for the critical item 
when studying the associates during the study phase and cannot correctly identify that it was 
not actually presented.  
The relationship between fuzzy trace theory and working memory is less clear-cut. It 
can be argued that higher working memory capacity may allow better verbatim traces to be 
created because of the highly specific details of items. Due to this, higher veridical recall is 
expected for individuals with a higher working memory capacity. However, gist traces are 
created separately from verbatim traces and may not entirely be related to working memory 
capacity and may be more of an implicit process. It is possible that there will be no 
correlation between working memory capacity and false memory if the latter is primarily 
driven by gist traces. On the other hand, gist representations may be used in tandem with 
verbatim representations to drive responses for recall and we cannot be certain that 
individuals with poorer working memory may create worse gist traces than individuals with 
higher working memory. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, individuals are able to use either 
verbatim or gist traces to reject critical items during recollection rejection.  
Detailed experimental hypothesis for the working memory results will be discussed in 
Chapter 2. However, as discussed above, the relationship between working memory capacity 
and false memory can be used to test for the predictions of activation/monitoring theory, but 





SUMMARY OF THESIS GOALS 
 
In summary, the goals of this thesis are threefold. First, we wish to reduce the paucity 
of research of phonological false memories. False memories have been mainly explored using 
semantic associations and their relationships with working memory capacity, prior recall and 
associative strength. These factors could be observed using phonological associates and 
investigated to see whether they are able to influence the likelihood of producing 
phonological false memories.  
Second, a crucial area we wish to investigate is an under-researched area of false 
memory that has been only briefly discussed by both Roediger and McDermott (1995) and 
Sommers and Lewis (1999) which is the effects of prior recall on later recognition. 
Investigating prior recall can be critical in understanding how we encode and retain 
information and how this may affect determining how false memories are produced. 
Lastly, we wish to disentangle the two theoretical accounts of activation/monitoring 
theory and fuzzy trace theory through the use of prior recall on phonological associates and 















In this experiment, we attempt to replicate the findings from Sommers and Lewis 
(1999) and also look at the effects of prior recall on later recognition. Some words that were 
used in their study had been repeated across lists, both within and between confusable lists. 
This might have created a potential confound that may have elevated the levels of false recall 
and recognition because participants may have wrongly attributed the activations of presented 
words and critical items to lists that they were not intended for. As such, care was taken to 
ensure that our lists comprised of unique words that were not repeated across lists. 












1. Proportion recognised as old 
Both activation/monitoring theory and fuzzy trace theory would predict the same 
pattern of results. For activation monitoring theory, activations between most confusable 
neighbours will higher than that for least confusable neighbours. Participants would record 
more false recall and false recognition for most confusable associates compared to least 
confusable associates. For veridical responses, we would expect higher veridical recall and 
veridical recognition for most confusable associates versus least confusable associates.  
Essentially we will find a similar pattern for fuzzy trace theory. Participants would be 
able to create verbatim representations for most confusable lists more easily due to a more 
apparent central theme alongside stronger gist representations. On the other hand, least 
confusable neighbours may produce weaker gist representations which may lead to less false 
recall and false recognition than for most confusable neighbours.  
Activation/monitoring and fuzzy trace theory is hypothesised to differ in terms of the 
effects of prior recall. 
 
Support for Activation/Monitoring Theory 
Items in the recalled condition should have higher recognition responses compared to 
those in the unrecalled condition. This follows the understanding from activation/monitoring 




Thus we should also see higher levels of recognition responses for both studied items and 





Support for Fuzzy Trace Theory 
 Studied items in the recalled condition should have higher recognition responses 
compared to those in the unrecalled condition (Figure 2.2). At the same time, the proportion 
of critical items in the recalled condition should be lower than that for the proportion of 
critical items in the unrecalled condition. During the study phase, verbatim and gist 
representations of the studied items are being created along with gist representations of the 
critical items. These verbatim representations of studied items and gist representations of 
critical items would then allow recollection rejection to occur, lowering the proportions of 

























Figure 2.1.  Hypothesized mean proportion of prior recall items as a function of stimulus type 




items and critical items are not recalled earlier, only gist representations of the list is created 





2. Correlations between Recall and Recognition 
We should see a positive relationship between recall and recognition, for both 
veridical and false memories. Recall of studied items should increase the likelihood for 
recognition of studied items, while false recall of critical items should elevate the possibility 
for higher proportions of false recognition. The relationships would be supported under both 
theories. All these correlations should also apply to both most confusable lists as well as least 
confusable lists. However, the difference between the two accounts of false memory may lie 

























Figure 2.2.  Hypothesized mean proportion of prior recall items as a function of stimulus type 




Support for Activation/Monitoring Theory 
In support for activation/monitoring theory, we would see a positive relationship 
between recall of studied items and false recognition of critical items. The activations created 
when studying the studied items allows activations for the critical item. Recalling the studied 
item would in turn strengthen its current activation for the studied item and consequently, the 
associated critical item.  
 
Support for Fuzzy Trace Theory 
On the other hand, recall for studied items should have a negative relationship with 
recognition of critical items if fuzzy trace theory holds. As participants recall more studied 
items, their verbatim representations would allow for recollection rejection to occur thus 
lowering false recognition of critical items.  
 
3. Correlations between Working Memory Measures, Recall, and Recognition 
It is hypothesized that the working memory measures (forward digit span, backward 
digit span and operation span) used in this experiment would correlate with one another.  
 
Support for Activation/Monitoring Theory 
Here we would expect working memory span scores to have a positive correlation 
with veridical recall and a negative correlation with false recall. Participants with a higher 
working memory capacity will potentially have better monitoring capabilities and thus lower 




see the same relationship for the correlations for working memory span scores and 
recognition results as well. 
 
Support for Fuzzy Trace Theory 
For fuzzy trace theory, we would expect to see a positive relationship between 
working memory span scores and veridical recall. We hypothesize this from the fact that 
participants with a higher span score would be able to create better veridical representations 
from highly detailed items than participants with a lower span score. This relationship may 
also be true for veridical recognition. However, due to the more implicit nature of gist traces 
we should not see a significant relationship between span scores and false recall. Similarly, 

















Eighty young adults enrolled in introductory Psychology class participated in 
Experiment 1 as part of their requirements for course credit. Participants were required to 
have English as their first language with no speech and hearing disorders, and have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
Design 
Repeated measures design was used for this experiment. Two dependent measures 
were analysed separately: proportion of items recalled and proportion of items recognised as 
old. Independent variables in this experiment include confusability (most confusable, least 
confusable), stimulus type (studied items, critical items, non-studied items [for recognition 
dependent measure only]) and prior recall (recalled, unrecalled). Prior recall as an 
independent variable was only applicable to the recognition dependent measure. 
 
Materials 
The stimuli used in Experiment 1 were taken from the word lists from Sommers and 
Lewis (1999). Words were chosen such that there was no repetition amongst the 24 lists. For 
each critical item, there were 10 most confusable associates and 10 least confusable 




A linguistically trained female Singaporean recorded the words using 16-bit mono, 
44.1-kHz, wav-format recording with their overall root-mean-square amplitudes digitally 
levelled. Twenty undergraduates from an independent sample identified the stimuli, and 
words that did not achieve at least 70% accuracy were rerecorded and retested. The mean 
correct-identification levels for most confusable words were 78% (SD = 5) and least 
confusable words were 80% (SD = 8). Words were also rated on familiarity ratings using the 
same sample and were rated on a 7-point scale where a higher rating score would be deemed 
more familiar. The 24 lists were then divided into 3 groups of 8 lists each for 
counterbalancing purposes. One-way ANOVAs were performed to compare the word 
properties (familiarity ratings, log frequency, spoken word duration) between the 3 groups 
and found that there were no significant differences between them (all Fs < 1.6). The mean 
word properties for the 3 groups are summarised in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1. Lexical characteristics equated for most confusable and least confusable associates 
in the 3 equated groups. 















Familiarity 6.64 (.21) 6.56 (.30) 6.66 (.18) 6.53 (.32) 6.51 (.19) 6.39 (.25) 
Log 
Frequency 
9.36 (.70) 9.24 (.78) 9.17 (.57) 8.76 (.70) 9.00 (.59) 8.62 (.64) 
Duration (ms) 632 (54) 646 (37) 615 (56) 616 (40) 622 (49) 635 (52) 








Participants were tested on individual PCs in groups of 5 or fewer using E-Prime 1.2 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) with stimuli binaurally played through 
Beyerdynamic DT150 headphones at approximately 70 dB SPL.  
Participants were told that they will hear a series of words that were presented one at a 
time and after each word list was presented, they were asked to recall as many of the words 
as possible regardless of the presentation order. After a practice trial, presentation of the lists 
began with a 1000ms pause followed by a READY screen which lasted for 500ms. This was 
then followed by the 10 words, with an interstimulus interval (ISI) of 500ms. They were then 
required to write down their responses into a booklet on a fresh page after each trial. 
Participants were given 1 minute to recall the words with a tone signalling the end of each 
recall phase and the next presentation of 10 words then began. Once all the word lists have 
been presented, participants were then asked to perform a computerised recognition task 
consisting of 96 items. The 96 items on the recognition task included the 24 critical items (16 
from presented lists and 8 from non-presented lists), and 3 items (taken from positions 2, 4, 
and 8) from each of the 16 presented lists and 8 from the non-presented lists. Therefore, each 
participant would see a total of 48 items from the studied lists and 48 items that were not 
presented including the 24 critical items.  For the recognition task, stimuli were presented 
aurally through the headphones one at a time, and participants were required to indicate 
whether the word was old (if it was presented earlier) or new (if it was not presented earlier) 






Working Memory Measures 
Following the recognition task, participants were given two digit span tasks (forward 
and backward digit span). Each sequence of digits was presented visually on the PC and 
increasing in length (from 2 digits to 8 digits) with an ISI of 500ms. After each sequence, 
participants were asked to type in their responses using the keyboard. Responses from 
participants were not controlled as they were allowed to use either the keys located on the 
number pad or those found along the single row. The two digit span tasks consisted of a total 
of 14 sequences each for forward and backward digit span for the experimental trials, with a 
practice trial of 2 sequences of digit length 2 each. Participants were given a raw score of 1 if 
both trials for the sequence were correct and 0.5 if only one trial was correct (Daneman & 
Carpenter, 1980). 
Participants were also given an operation span task as a measure of complex working 
memory capacity as described by Turner and Engle (1989). The task consisted of equation-
letter sequences in which participants were required to indicate whether the equation is 
correct or incorrect using the keyboard. The equations consist of 2 simple operations: an 
addition or subtraction problem and a multiplication or division problem. For example, they 
may be given an equation  
IS (8/2) + 6 = 10? 
As the equation is correct, participants would have to press “1” on the keyboard. On the other 
hand, they may also be given another equation such as: 
IS (5 x 4) – 5 = 14? 
As the equation is incorrect, participants would then press “2” on the keyboard. The computer 




equations mentally and were not given pens or paper to do these calculations. Once the 
equations were verified, a letter would then appear on the screen (F, H, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, 
J, or Y). Participants were required to memorise this letter. Following this, another equation-
letter sequence would appear. 
There were 3 practice trials containing 2 operation sequences and 15 experimental 
trials which increased from 3 to 7 in terms of set size (the number of letters they had to 
memorise) with 3 trials at each set size. After the last operation in a trial, participants were 
told to input their answers in the correct order in which the letters were presented using the 
keyboard.  
Operation span score was calculated by giving a raw score of 1 if all trials were 
correct and raw score of 0.5 if 2 out of the 3 trials were correct (Daneman & Carpenter, 
1980). Participants were told before they started the operation span task that they needed to 
get at least 85% of the equations correct. Data for participants who did not achieve this cut-












RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Three participants who did not achieve the cut-off for the operation span task were 
removed from subsequent analyses. 
 
Recall 
Table 2.2.  Mean proportion of studied items and critical items recalled for  
Experiment 1. 
 Stimulus Type 
Confusability Studied Items Critical Items 
Most confusable lists .45 (.10) .27 (.18) 
Least confusable lists .46 (.11) .25 (.17) 
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.2 displays the mean proportion of studied items, and critical items that were 
recalled for lists consisting of the most and least confusable neighbours of critical items. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA with Stimulus Type (studied item, critical items) and 
Confusability (most confusable, least confusable) was conducted. Analysis of the data 
revealed that only the main effect of Stimulus Type was significant, F(1, 76) = 94.41, MSE = 
.03, p < .001, suggesting that more studied items were recalled than critical items. The 
interaction effect for Stimulus Type X Confusability was not significant, F(1, 76) = 1.50, 
MSE = .02, p = .22, and main effect of Confusability was not significant either, F(1, 76) = 
0.56, MSE = .01, p =.46.  
Results here did not replicate the findings for Sommers and Lewis (1999). The 




was found in their Experiment 3 for both confusable lists. In addition, we did not find an 
effect of confusability which they found where there was a lower incidence of false recall of 
critical items in the least confusable lists. However, it should be noted that the proportions of 
studied items and critical items that were recalled were comparable to other studies that used 
phonological lists (Ballou & Sommers, 2008).  
 
Recognition 
In this design, there were two false alarm rates, one for the critical items and one for 
the new items from the non-studied lists. On the other hand, there is only one hit rate, which 
is the correct recognition of studied items. A d’ analysis, which is traditionally used in 
recognition memory experiments, is not appropriate here given the unequal false alarm and 
hit rates. Recognition performance was therefore analysed in terms of the proportion of items 
that were recognised as old, which contains the single hit rate as well as the two false alarm 
rates.  
Table 2.3.  Mean proportion of studied items, critical items, and other non-presented words 
recognised as old for two types of lists presented in Experiment 1. 
  Stimulus Type  
Condition 
Studied Items Critical Items 
Other Non-Studied 
Items 
Most confusable lists .69 (.14) .62 (.22) .20 (.15) 
Least confusable lists  .64 (.15) .58 (.19) .19 (.14) 
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 2.3 displays the mean proportion of studied items, critical items, and other non-




ANOVA conducted on the proportion of items recognised as old revealed a main effect of 
Stimulus Type, F(2, 152) = 465.72, MSE = .02, p < .001. Follow up t-tests indicated that the 
proportion of studied items recognised as old (M = .67, SD = .12) was significantly greater 
than both the proportions for critical items (M = .59, SD = .16), t(76) = 3.94, p < .001, and 
other non-studied items (M = .19, SD = .13), t(76) = 27.96, p < .001. In addition, the 
proportion of critical items recognised as old was greater than the proportion of other non-
studied items, t(76) = 29.02, p < .001. A significant main effect of Confusability was also 
found, F(1, 76) = 6.02, MSE = .02, p = .016, where recognition of lists with most confusable 
associates were higher than least confusable associates. The interaction effect for Stimulus 
Type X Confusability was not found to be significant, F(1, 152) = 6.02, MSE = .02, p = .43.  
It is interesting to note here that while confusability did not provide a main effect for 
recall, it did so for recognition responses. Also, the proportion of false recognition of the 
critical item was more than 50% for both confusable lists, suggesting that false memory 
exists and at a substantial level. The proportions for veridical and false recognition attained 
for Experiment 1 also mirrored those found in other studies involving phonological associates 
(Watson, Balota & Roediger, 2003; Ballou & Sommers, 2008). Recognition responses also 
seem to indicate that there is an effect of prior recall, which we will now look into.  
 
Effects of Prior Recall 
The means and standard deviations for most confusable and least confusable lists in 






Table 2.4. Means and standard deviations for both confusable lists in terms of prior recall in 
Experiment 1. 
 Stimulus Type 
 Studied Items Critical Items 
Confusability Recalled Unrecalled Recalled Unrecalled 
Most confusable lists .35 (.14) .34 (.12) .21 (.17) .41 (.21) 
Least confusable lists .35 (.15) .29 (.13) .21 (.16) .36 (.19) 
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was run on the proportion of items recognised as old 
with Prior Recall (recalled, unrecalled), Stimulus Type (studied items, critical items) and 
Confusability (most confusable, least confusable). Results revealed an interaction effect of 
Prior Recall X Stimulus Type, F(1, 76) = 46.26, MSE = .04, p < .001 (Figure 2.3). 
Subsequent analyses found that for critical items, there were more previously unrecalled 
items (M = .38, SD = .15), that were falsely recognised as old than previously recalled items 
(M = .21, SD = .12), t(76) = -7.09, p < .001. For previously recalled items, more studied items 
(M = .35, SD = .13), were recognised as old than critical items (M = .21, SD = .12), t(76) = 
7.10, p < .001. Lastly, for previously unrecalled items, more critical items (M = .38, SD = 
.15), were falsely recognised as old than studied items (M = .31, SD = .11), t(76) = -4.26, p < 
.001.  
A significant main effect were found for Confusability, F(1, 76) = 6.58, MSE = .01, p 
= .012, where the proportion of items recognised as old was greater for most confusable lists 
compared to least confusable lists. Main effects of Stimulus Type, F(1, 76) = 15.95, MSE = 
.01, p < .001, and Prior Recall were found, F(1, 76) = 14.77, MSE = .05, p < .001, but these 
were not investigated further due to the interaction effect found for Prior Recall X Stimulus 







Analyses of prior recall revealed an interesting trend that leans towards support for 
fuzzy trace theory. The pattern of results showed evidence for verbatim representations for 
studied items, following a high proportion of items recognised as old in the recalled 
condition. Gist representations were clearly marked by elevated levels of recognition 
responses for items in the unrecalled condition. When studying these lists, the verbatim traces 
and gist traces are encoded in parallel. Retrieval of the verbatim trace would strengthen later 
recognition responses and may also reinforce gist traces in tandem. Upon being presented an 
item during the recognition task, items that were previously unrecalled would now seem more 
familiar to the participant signalling to him or her that the item may have been presented 
previously. At the same time, critical items that were recalled previously would activate a 
mismatch between the verbatim trace for studied items, as well as the gist trace for the critical 
item. Because of this, participants would then reject the critical item even though they have 
























Figure 2.3.  Mean proportion of prior recall items as a function of stimulus type in Experiment 1. 




In addition, we did not find elevated proportions of false recognition of critical items 
in the studied condition which would have been the case for activation/monitoring theory. 
The theory predicts that recognition responses for both studied and critical items in the 
recalled condition should be higher than the unrecalled condition, due to higher levels of 
activations between the items strengthened by prior recall. 
 
Correlations between Recall and Recognition  





 Studied Items Critical Items 
Most Confusable Lists 
Recognition 
Studied Items .31** .02 
Critical Items -.28** .24* 
Least Confusable Lists 
Recognition 
Studied Items .33** .02 
Critical Items -.32** .40** 
** p <. 01, *p < .05    
 
Table 2.5 shows the correlations between recall and recognition for both most 
confusable and least confusable lists. For most confusable lists, recall of studied items was 
positively correlated with recognition of studied items, r = .31, p < .001. However, recall of 
studied items was negatively correlated with recognition of critical items, r = -.28, p < .05, 
suggesting that as participants recall more studied items there is less tendency for them to 




with recognition of critical items, r = .24, p < .05, where falsely recalling a critical item will 
increase the likelihood of its false recognition later. 
For least confusable associates, it was found that recall and recognition of studied 
items were significantly correlated, r = .33, p < .001. As participants recall more studied 
items; they are more likely to recognise them as old later. Similar to most confusable lists, 
recall of studied items was negatively correlated with recognition of critical items, r = -.32, p 
< .001. The higher the number of studied items recalled will lead to a lesser possibility for 
critical items to be recognised as old. Recall and recognition of critical items was positively 
correlated, r = .40, p < .001, suggesting that if participants had falsely recalled critical items, 
they are more likely to recognise them as old later.  
The overall pattern of results is virtually identical for both most and least confusable 
lists. Recall and recognition for studied items showed a positive relationship with each 
another; similarly, false recall and false recognition for critical items showed the same 
pattern. The interesting relationship here is that of the recall of studied items and false 
recognition of critical items. In both lists, as the number of studied items increases, there will 
be less false recognition of critical items. This particular correlation seems to lean toward the 
idea of fuzzy trace views, rather than activation/monitoring. The recall of studied items may 
have created strong verbatim representations and these representations allow participants to 
better distinguish between presented items and non-presented items.  
 
Correlations between Working Memory Measures, Recall, and Recognition 
Table 2.6 shows the means and standard deviations for the individual memory span 




Table 2.6.  Means and standard deviations for memory span scores for Experiment 1. 
Item Type Mean SD 
Forward digit span 6.83 0.92 
Backward digit span 6.41 1.01 
Operation span 5.13 1.20 
 
The correlations among the memory span measures in Experiment 1 are listed in 
Table 2.7. As expected, the correlations between the three working memory measures were 
significant. Forward digit span scores was significantly correlated with both backward digit 
span scores, r = .54, p < .001, and operation span scores, r = .31, p < .001. Backward digit 
span scores was also significantly correlated with operation span scores, r = .53, p < .001.  
Table 2.7.  Correlations among memory span measures in Experiment 1. 
 Forward Digit Span Backward Digit Span 
Backward digit span .54**  
Operation span .31** .53** 
** p <. 01, *p < .05   
 
The three working memory measures were also significantly correlated with recall of 
studied items for most confusable lists and least confusable lists (Table 2.8). 
For most confusable lists, recall of studied items was positively correlated with 
forward digit span scores, r = .25, p < .05, backward digit span scores, r = .34, p < .001, and 
operation span scores, r = .23, p < .05. Recall of studied items seems to have a positive 
relationship with the three working memory measures, where higher span scores would also 




For least confusable lists, recall of studied items was also significantly correlated with 
forward digit span scores, r = .32, p < .001, backward digit span scores, r = .40, p < .001, and 
operation span scores, r = .27, p < .05. Like the most confusable lists, recall of studied items 
in least confusable condition seems to have a positive relationship with the three memory 
span scores where higher span scores would increase the likelihood for recall of studied 
items.  
 
Table 2.8.  Correlations among memory span measures and variables for both confusable lists 








Most Confusable Lists 
Recall Studied Items 
.25* .34** .23* 
Critical Items 
.08 .09 .01 
Recognition Studied Items 
.06 .13 .03 
Critical Items 
.03 -.14 -.17 
Least Confusable Lists 
Recall Studied Items 
.32** .40** .27** 
Critical Items 
.05 .06 -.0004 
Recognition Studied Items 
.04 .11 .08 
Critical Items 
.09 -.06 -.04 
** p <. 01, *p < .05 
 
However, none of the working memory measures correlated with recall of critical 
items or recognition of studied items and critical items. At first glance, these results seem to 




correlational results for the recognition responses, especially for the studied item poses a 
problem in teasing apart these two theories. First, this could imply that recognition responses 
may not be related to working memory capacity or that recognition may be dependent on the 
rate of recall. Second, these results do not fully support activation/monitoring theory but they 
are inconclusive in supporting fuzzy trace theories because of the possibility that gist 
representations may be more implicit in nature. In sum, working memory span results may be 
inadequate in teasing apart these two theories.   
The general pattern of results from Experiment 1 seems to favour fuzzy trace views 
over activation/monitoring theory. In light of this, the next experiment will attempt to extend 
these current findings with the use of the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985) during 
the recognition phase. The remember/know paradigm is a measure of recollection and 
familiarity, and this is similar to what fuzzy trace theory posits. Verbatim representations are 
related to recollection where there is a conscious awareness of the specific items that was 
represented. Gist representations on the other hand, is represented by feelings for familiarity 
















In Experiment 2, we wish to conduct further investigation as to how phonological 
associates are remembered using the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985). This task is 
often used to investigate recollection and familiarity and how they contribute to recognition. 
The assumption here is that remember judgments are taken as recollections while know 
judgments are regarded as familiarity judgments. A more accurate description would be that 
remember judgments are words that the participants are consciously aware and have 
experienced the moment when the word was presented. On the other hand, know judgments 
are those that they are certain that it was previously presented but cannot recall the exact 
occurrence of its appearance as though they are not consciously aware of its presentation.   
Previous studies looking at false recognition consistently provide evidence revealing 
that the majority of the recognition of studied items was remember judgments, but the 
differences lie in the subjective experience for false recognitions of critical items (Geraci & 
McCabe, 2006; Schacter, Verfallie & Anes, 1997). For semantic associates, it was generally 
found that the proportion of remember judgments for critical items was higher than know 





However, to our current knowledge no previous study has examined remember/know 
judgments in the context of prior recall. As noted earlier, verbatim representations are related 
to recollection where there is a conscious awareness of the specific items that was 
represented. Gist representations on the other hand, is represented by feelings for familiarity 
and is comparable to the idea of know judgments. The specific predictions and rationale for 




Similar to what was expected in Experiment 1 for the role of prior recall in 
contributing to false memories, Experiment 2 brings forward a few more hypotheses for the 
remember/know judgments. 
 
Support for Activation Monitoring Theory 
For the recalled condition, we would expect a higher proportion of studied items 
recognised as old with remember judgments compared to know judgments (Figure 3.1). We 
would expect to see a similar trend for the unrecalled condition where we would see a higher 








According to activation/monitoring theory, when an item is presented, its associates 
are also activated along with the item itself. Recalling the item will strengthen this activation 
response leading to a higher likelihood that the item would be recognised as old later. This 
item would also be identified as a remember judgment, as participants would be most likely 
be consciously aware of its presentation during the study phase. This is evident in the recalled 
condition. In the unrecalled condition, due to the activation processes that were created from 
studying the presented item, its associated words would have been activated as well although 
to a lesser degree. Even though participants may have not recalled these items, their 
activations would still be sufficient to allow a higher proportion of items recognised as old 


























Figure 3.1.  Hypothesized mean proportion of remember and know judgments for studied 







For critical items, we would expect to see a similar pattern of results like the one for 
studied items (Figure 3.2). As participants recall more studied items, the activations for the 
critical item may also occur but to a lesser extent compared to that for presented neighbours. 
Due to this activation, there would be a higher proportion of critical items that would be 
recognised as old with remember judgments than know judgments. This is especially so for 
critical items in the recalled condition, where a higher proportion of critical items with 
remember judgments would be expected compared to the critical items found in the 
unrecalled condition. 
 
Support for Fuzzy Trace Theory 
 Here, we should see a similar trend for the recalled condition for studied items as the 


























Figure 3.2.  Hypothesized mean proportion of remember and know judgments for critical 




(Figure 3.3). For previously recalled studied items, there would be a higher proportion of 
items recognised as old with remember judgments compared to know judgments. How this 
works is that studying the item and recalling it strengthens the verbatim representations 
leading to higher proportions for remember judgments. At the same time, we would expect 
that the proportions of know judgments for studied items recognised as old to be lower than 
those for remember judgments. In the unrecalled condition for studied items, we would 
expect that these items be driven mostly by gist representations due to the lack of verbatim 
representations created to elicit recall. A stronger sense of familiarity with the theme of the 
list would drive participants to respond with more know judgments than remember judgments 






























Figure 3.3.  Hypothesized mean proportion of remember and know judgments for studied 




For critical items, remember and know judgments for items in the recalled condition 
would be lower than those found for the unrecalled condition. This primarily due to the fact 
that there will be a lower proportion of critical items recognised as old brought about by 
recollection rejection. The differences between remember and know judgments in the recalled 
condition for critical items would also be less pronounced compared to that found for studied 
items. The direction that the remember and know judgments for critical items in the 
unrecalled condition would take would also mirror that found for studied items, suggesting 
































Figure 3.4.  Hypothesized mean proportion of remember and know judgments for critical 







Eighty undergraduates enrolled in an introductory Psychology class took part in 
Experiment 2. For their participation, they each received credits for their time. Participants 
were required to have English as their first language with no speech and hearing disorders, 
and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
Design 
Repeated measures design was used for this experiment. Two dependent measures 
were analysed separately: proportion of items recalled and proportion of items recognised as 
old. Independent variables in this experiment include confusability (most confusable, least 
confusable), stimulus type (studied items, critical items, non-studied items [for recognition 
dependent measure only]), prior recall (recalled, unrecalled), and judgment (remember/know 
[for words recognised as old only]). Prior recall and judgment as independent variables were 
only applicable to the recognition dependent measure. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure used in Experiment 2 was similar to that in Experiment 1 with an 
addition of the remember/know paradigm (Tulving, 1985) during the recognition task.  
Before the recognition task, participants were given a sheet of paper describing the 




Participants were told that they were required to first indicate whether the word was 
presented during the first part of the experiment by pressing either “1” or “2” on the 
keyboard. Words were recognised as old (by pressing “1”) if they were thought to have been 
presented previously and as new (by pressing “2”) if the word was thought to be not 
presented. In addition, participants were told to make a remember or know judgment on the 
items they indicated to be old (by pressing either “R” or “K” on the keyboard). Participants 
also had to undergo the 3 memory span measures as listed in Experiment 1. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
One participant did not achieve the cut-off for the operation span task and was 
removed from subsequent analyses. 
 
Recall 
The pattern of results from Experiment 1 was replicated in Experiment 2. Table 3.1 
displays the mean proportion of studied items, and critical items that were recalled for lists 
consisting of the most and least confusable neighbours of critical items. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Stimulus Type (studied item, critical item) and Confusability (most 
confusable, least confusable) was conducted. Analysis of the data revealed that only the main 
effect of Stimulus Type was significant, F(1, 78) = 118.18, MSE = .03, p < .001, where more 
studied items were recalled than critical items. The interaction effect for Stimulus Type X 
Confusability was not significant, F(1, 78) = 2.62, MSE = .02, p = .11, and main effect of 




Table 3.1.  Mean proportion of studied items and critical items recalled for  
Experiment 2. 
 Stimulus Type 
Confusability Studied Items Critical Items 
Most confusable lists .43 (.09) .26 (.20) 
Least confusable lists 
.45 (.08) .24 (.17) 
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
Recognition 
Table 3.2 displays the mean proportion of studied items, critical items, and other non-
presented words recognised as old for the two types of lists used. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA conducted on the proportion of items recognised as old revealed a main effect of 
Stimulus Type, F(2, 156) = 442.61, MSE = .02,  p < .001. Follow up t-tests indicated that the 
proportion of studied items recognised as old (M = .67, SD = .14) was higher than the 
proportion of both critical items (M = .52, SD = .21), t(78) = 8.12, p < .001, and other non-
studied items (M = .17, SD = .13), t(78) = 31.05, p < .001. Also, the proportion of critical 
items recognised as old was significantly higher than other non-studied items, t(78) = 19.51, 
p < .001.  
 
Table 3.2.  Mean proportion of studied items, critical items and other non-presented words 
recognised as old for two types of lists presented in Experiment 2. 
 Stimulus Type 
Confusability 
Studied Items Critical Items Other Non-Studied 
Items 
Most confusable lists .69 (.13) .54 (.25) .19 (.16) 
Least confusable lists .64 (.16) .51 (.23) .14 (.12) 




A significant main effect of Confusability was also found, F(1,78) = 14.05, MSE = 
.02, p < .001, where proportion of items recognised as old was higher in lists with most 
confusable associates than least confusable associates. However, the interaction effect for 
Stimulus Type X Confusability was not found to be significant, F(2, 156) = 0.49, MSE = .01, 
p = .61. The pattern of results found here is similar to the one found for Experiment 1.  
 
Effects of Prior Recall 
Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations for both confusable lists in terms of prior recall in 
Experiment 2. 
 Stimulus Type 
 Studied Items Critical Items 
Confusability Recalled Unrecalled Recalled Unrecalled 
Most confusable lists .35 (.14) .34 (.12) .21 (.17) .41 (.21) 
Least confusable lists .35 (.15) .29 (.13) .21 (.16) .36 (.19) 
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
The means and standard deviations for most confusable and least confusable lists in 
terms of prior recall are listed in Table 3.3. 
A repeated-measures ANOVA was run on the proportion of items recognised as old 
with Prior Recall (recalled, unrecalled), Stimulus Type (studied items, critical items) and 
Confusability (most confusable, least confusable), and revealed an interaction effect of Prior 
Recall X Stimulus Type, F(1, 78) = 25.56, MSE = .03, p < .001. The mean proportion of prior 
recall items as a function of stimulus type is shown in Figure 3.5. Subsequent analyses found 
that for critical items, there were more previously unrecalled items (M = .33, SD = .15) that 




.001. For recalled items, more studied items (M = .33, SD = .10) were recognised as old than 





A main effect was found for Confusability, F(1, 78) = 7.70, MSE = .01, p = .007, 
where the proportion of items recognised as old was higher in lists with most confusable 
associates than least confusable associates. Main effects of Stimulus Type, F(1, 78) = 62.80, 
MSE = .01, p < .001, and Prior Recall was were found, F(1, 78) = 14.58, MSE = .04, p < .001, 
but there were not interpreted due to the significant interaction of Prior Recall X Stimulus 
Type. All other interactions were not found to be significant (all Fs < 2.83).  
Results on the effects of prior recall for Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1’s 
finding of the lower proportion of critical items being recognised as old in the recalled 
condition. This is especially critical in distinguishing between the two theories, since 
























Figure 3.5.  Mean proportion of prior recall items as a function of stimulus type in 





responses for critical items in the previously recalled condition than the previously unrecalled 
condition.  
Figure 3.6 shows the mean proportion of remember and know judgments for Studied 
Items as a function of Prior Recall. A repeated-measures ANOVA was run on the proportion 
of studied items recognised as old with Prior Recall (recalled, unrecalled) and Judgment 
(remember, know), and found an interaction effect of Prior Recall X Judgment, F(1, 78) = 
52.21, MSE = .01, p < .001. Subsequent analyses found that for previously recalled studied 
items, there were a higher proportion of studied items (M = .24, SD = .12) that had remember 
judgments than know judgments (M = .10, SD = .10), t(78) = 6.34, p < .001. For remember 
judgments, there were a higher proportion of previously recalled items (M = .24, SD = .12) 
than previously unrecalled items (M = .15, SD = .11), t(78) = 5.66, p < .001. For know 
judgments, there were more previously unrecalled items (M = .17, SD = .09) than previously 
recalled items (M = .10, SD = .10), t(78) = -5.25, p < .001. A main effect of Judgment was 
also found to be significant, F(1, 78) = 12.69, MSE = .02, p = .001 but the main effect of 
Prior Recall was not found to be significant, F(1, 78) = .16, MSE = .01, p = .69. However, 









Figure 3.7 shows the mean proportion of remember and know judgments for Critical 
Items as a function of Stimulus Type. A repeated-measures ANOVA was run on the 
proportion of critical items recognised as old with Prior Recall (recalled, unrecalled) and 
Judgment (remember, know), and found a significant main effect of Prior Recall, F(1, 78) = 
32.05, MSE = .0, p < .001. The main effect of Judgment was not found to be significant, F(1, 
78) = .002, MSE = .02, p = .96, and the interaction effect of Prior Recall X Judgment was also 




























Figure 3.6.  Mean proportion of remember and know judgments for studied items as a 








Through the use of the remember/know paradigm, we further investigated the effects 
of prior recall on phonological associates and further substantiate our claim for fuzzy trace 
views with replicated results. In addition, the remember/know judgments also seem to point 
toward fuzzy trace views. For studied items in the recalled condition, there was a 
significantly higher proportion of items recognised as old with remember judgments than 
know judgments. However, for the unrecalled condition for studied items, we did not find a 
significant difference between remember and know judgments. Studied items that were 
previously recalled would have verbatim representations in place, and these representations 
would be transferred over during recognition. The remember judgments shown for the 
studied items underline the fact that participants were consciously aware of its presentation 
earlier. The lack of difference between the judgments in the unrecalled condition for studied 


























Figure 3.7.  Mean proportion of remember and know judgments for critical items as a 





participants are relying more on gist representations to drive their recognition responses for 
studied items in the unrecalled condition.  
For critical items, we saw only a significant main effect of prior recall which differed 
from what was expected from these results initially. We had expected that there would have 
been more know responses for both the recalled and unrecalled conditions for critical items, 
due to the fact that gist representations would drive the false recognitions of critical items.  
 
Correlations between recall and recognition 
Table 3.4 shows the correlations between recall and recognition for most confusable 
lists and least confusable lists in Experiment 2. 





 Studied Items Critical Items 
Most Confusable Lists 
Recognition 
Studied Items .24* .17 
Critical Items -.07 .42** 
Least Confusable Lists 
Recognition 
Studied Items .19 .19 
Critical Items -.14 .42** 
**p <. 01, *p < .05    
 
For most confusable lists, recall of studied items was positively correlated with 




more likely to correctly recognise these items as old later. Recall of critical items was also 
significantly correlated with recognition of critical items, r = .42 p < .001, suggesting that 
when participants recall more critical items, there is a tendency to falsely recognise these 
critical items as old during the recognition phase. However, unlike in Experiment 1, recall of 
studied items was not found to be negatively correlated with recognition of critical items, r = 
-.07, p = .56. Although these results are in the same direction as in Experiment 1, participants 
were not less likely to recognise critical items as old after recalling studied items.  
For least confusable lists, it was found that recall and recognition of studied items 
were not significantly correlated, r = .19, p < .001, unlike in Experiment 1. Results also 
differed from Experiment 1 where recall of studied items was not significantly correlated 
with recognition of critical items, r = -.14, p = .10. These two results, although in the same 
direction as Experiment 1, seems to suggest that the relationship between recall and 
recognition may not be consistent and could be attributed to the introduction of the 
remember/know instructions during the recognition phase. Geraci and McCabe (2006) found 
that having modified remember/know instructions can reduce the incidence of false memories 
through the act in retrieving information on the studied items. This could have led 
participants to be more consciously aware of their responses.  However, recall and 
recognition of critical items was positively correlated, r = .42, p < .001, suggesting that false 
recall of critical items may increase the possibility of later false recognition. 
 
Correlations between Working Memory Measures, Recall, and Recognition 
Table 3.5 shows the means and standard deviations for the individual memory span 




Table 3.5.  Means and standard deviations for memory span scores for Experiment 2. 
Item Type Mean SD 
Forward digit span 6.94 0.84 
Backward digit span 6.43 1.11 
Operation span 5.26 1.07 
 
The correlations among the variables in Experiment 2 are listed in Table 3.6. As 
expected, the correlations between the three working memory measures were significant. 
Forward digit span scores was significantly correlated with both backward digit span scores, r 
= .49, p < .001, and operation span scores, r = .32, p < .001. Backward digit span scores was 
also significantly correlated with operation span scores, r = .41, p < .001.  
 
Table 3.6.  Correlations among memory span measures in Experiment 2. 
 Forward Digit Span Backward Digit Span 
Backward digit span .49**  
Operation span .32** .41** 
** p <. 01, *p < .05   
 
The three working memory measures were not found to be significantly correlated 
with recall for studied items for most confusable lists (Table 3.7) unlike what was found for 
Experiment 1.  For least confusable lists, recall for studied items was only significantly 
correlated with operation span scores, r = .23, p < .05, but not backward digit span scores, r = 
.15, p = .18, and forward digit span scores, r = .15, p = .19. Unlike in Experiment 1, 




Table 3.7.  Correlations among memory span measures and variables for both confusable lists 








Most Confusable Lists 
Recall 
Studied Items -.04 .03 .16 
Critical Items .14 .11 -.06 
Recognition 
Studied Items .03 .02 -.04 
Critical Items .12 .19 -.09 
Least Confusable Lists 
Recall 
Studied Items .15 .15 .23* 
Critical Items -.16 -.04 -.12 
Recognition 
Studied Items .10 .02 -.06 
Critical Items -.05 -.003 -.08 
** p <. 01, *p < .05 
 
Comparisons between samples for Experiment 1 and 2 
 To investigate if the discrepancies for the correlational results for Experiment 1 and 2 
could be due to the differences in the working memory capacity of the two samples of 
participants, a one-way ANOVA was performed for the three working memory span 
measures and the two samples. Analyses revealed that there were no significant differences 
between the samples from Experiment 1 and 2 for forward digit span scores, F(1, 154) = .63, 
p = .43; backward digit span scores, F(1, 154) = .016, p = .90; and operation span scores, F(1, 
154) = .51, p = .48. Data suggest that the difference in the correlational results may not be 
attributed to the difference in samples, but it is suspected that the additional requirement for 




 In summary, the results of Experiment 2 generally replicated the recall and 
recognition results found in Experiment 1. Also, the results from the prior recall condition 
seem to the support fuzzy trace theory than activation/monitoring theory. None of the 
correlational patterns were replicated except for one, and the outcome of the remember/know 






















SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
Using phonological associates and prior recall, we have investigated its effects on 
later recognition and found results that lean towards fuzzy trace views. Initial analyses 
indicated an effect for confusability where more confusable words tended to have higher 
veridical and false recognition rates than least confusable words, supporting the argument 
Sommers and Lewis (1999) posited that phonological associates may follow 
activation/monitoring process. However, further investigations revealed that confusability did 
not interact with prior recall. Previously unrecalled critical items were more likely to be 
falsely recognised than previously recalled critical items. This proved to be opposite of what 
activation/monitoring theory predicts and is more in line with fuzzy trace views.  
 Experiment 2 replicated these results for prior recall and strengthened our argument 
for fuzzy trace views. However, the results from the remember/know task proved 
inconclusive in furthering our argument for fuzzy trace theory. We found more remember 
responses for previously recalled words than unrecalled words for studied items, but there 
were no significant differences for remember and know responses for critical items in both 




further investigation is required to make sense of this phenomenon. We suspect that 
participants may have been conservative in their remember and know judgments for the 
critical items due to conflicting representations that are created from both verbatim and gist 
traces. On one hand, the verbatim trace from remembering the studied item allows them to 
reject critical items, but at the same time the prevalence of familiarity for these words allows 
them to record comparable remember and know judgments for the unrecalled critical items. 
In other words, participants may have generated the critical item consciously during recall, 
but did not report the critical item because they are aware that the critical item did not appear 
amongst the studied items. 
Our investigations from the use of working memory capacity also proved inadequate 
in teasing apart the two theories. Conflicting results from Experiment 1 and 2 seems to 
suggest that such measures are perhaps poor to capture processes that may be more implicit 
in nature especially when it comes to unconscious spreading activation and understanding the 
theme of the lists being presented. Other studies like Peters et al. (2007) and Watson et al. 
(2005) also found conflicting results for the relationships between working memory and false 
memories. Even with conflicting results, more focus should be emphasized in the pursuit in 
finding the relationship between working memory and false memories. In one particular 
study, Leding (2012) investigated this relationship and found that individuals with high 
working memory capacity were able to utilise recollection rejection as a memory-editing 
strategy in reducing false memories. Like previously discussed, results in this study seem to 
favour fuzzy trace views, especially for the effects of prior recall, which employ recollection 






RELATION TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
 In their arguments for activation/monitoring theory, Sommers and Lewis (1999) also 
suggested that confusability may help to account for fuzzy trace theory. In their argument for 
support for fuzzy trace theory, they argue that least confusable neighbours of the critical 
items may create less robust gist representations compared to more confusable neighbours, 
and thus reduce the number of false memories. We compare this idea of confusability to what 
Carneiro et al. (2012) proposed in their study: theme identifiability. Participants who are able 
to produce the theme of a list more easily may not have the tendency to confuse the items of 
that list. Likewise, participants who are unable to produce the critical item from a low 
identifiable list may be more likely to confuse the items on the low identifiable list. As such, 
when participants are able to produce the critical item of a high identifiable list during recall, 
recollection rejection may occur for subsequent recognition while still maintaining a high rate 
of veridical recognition. On the other hand, participants given a low identifiable list may not 
prescribed the use of recollection rejection as easily and thus elevate the levels of false 
recognition of critical items and having a lower rate of veridical recognition than participants 
on a high identifiable list.  
 Our work here tried to extend what Roediger and McDermott (1995) discussed on the 
effects of prior recall on later recognition. We found a similar pattern of results in the 
unrecalled condition where there were a higher proportion of critical items that were 
recognised as old compared to studied items. This finding illustrates that there may be 
powerful lingering effects of memory representations; especially gist representations that may 




items with a high proportion were items that were not presented and were not recalled 
initially.  
Huff and Hutchinson (2011) have also argued that it is difficult to separate fuzzy trace 
theory and activation monitoring theory from each other. Associated items on a list may share 
an overlap in semantic features which may then form a more consistent theme amongst them. 
To explore this further, they used words from mediated lists that were highly associated with 
a target word in order to create a list of words also associated with the ones on from the 
mediated lists but not directly associated with the target word. Using snow as a target word, 
associated words on the mediated list such as ski, and sleigh were used to generate items for 
the study list. Words that had the highest associative strength (e.g. slope, and reindeer) with 
words from the mediated lists were then placed into study lists. Through these lists, the 
authors could then effectively test activation monitoring processes since these study lists have 
had their gist representations removed. Their data supported associative activation but could 
not completely rule out the contribution of gist information during the encoding process. In 
order to rule out gist processes, future research needs to look toward creating lists that 
revolves around a consistent theme, while at the same time remove all possible associated 
relationships between the studied items.   
   
LIMITATIONS 
 
 This study on the effects of prior recall on phonological associates also has its 
limitations. First, we did not test how the items are recalled in the list. It could be that the first 




presented in the middle of the list. Earlier items that are recorded during the recall phase may 
be attributed to more verbatim representations while later items could be based more on gist 
representations. Furthermore, false recall of critical items may also appear later in the recall 
list as false memories rely on gist representations. Second, words used from Sommers and 
Lewis (1999) did not contain information with regards to their associative strength to the 
critical item, and were not listed according to associative strength. Thus, we were unable to 
determine whether some words will be remembered more easily than others. With such 
information, we could establish whether certain lists could have elicited critical items more 
easily than others which bring us to the third limitation. 
 Third, some studies (e.g. Huff & Hutchinson, 2011; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 
1999) have argued that certain list combinations in investigating false memories may produce 
different levels of false recall and false recognition. Also, separating gist information from 
associated words or creating theme consistent lists without associative information may not 
be available for most word lists and it would be a difficult task for future researchers to create 
lists that provide such information.  This study did not fully establish which critical items 
were more easily falsely recalled and falsely recognized by participants. This information 
may be crucial in determining whether certain lists are more consistent in producing false 
memories, and whether some lists should be omitted or replaced in order to have a fuller 
support for fuzzy trace theory.  
In sum, perhaps creating normative lists for phonological associates may be a good 
idea to start assessing how these associates can be used to test out phonological false 
memories as what has been done for semantic associates (see Stadler, Roediger, & 





FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Data from the remember/know paradigm seems to reaffirm that the results for studied 
items is more consistent throughout the literature. However, our results for the critical items 
were inconclusive and we suggest that the use of an indirect measure of false memories be 
introduced to test out our fuzzy trace hypothesis. This may prove to be challenging as it 
requires a larger pool of phonological associates and their corresponding critical items.  
The main conundrum here is whether these phonological lists are encoded like 
semantic lists, and if so, whether encoding these words have an effect for future recognition 
results. Another question that needs to be answered is whether we can create phonological 
lists similar to that from Huff and Hutchinson (2011) where we can reduce the amount of gist 
information that can be extracted from each list. One possible exploration could be creating 
phonological lists through the use of clustering coefficients where the clustering coefficient 
refers to the similarity among neighbours of a target word (Chan and Vitevitch, 2009). Take 
for instance the target word cat, whose phonological neighbours are fat, that, and cab while at 
the same time, the words fat and that are also neighbours of each other. As such, lists derived 
from calculating these clustering coefficients may enable us to further explore the 
relationship between false memory and lists with either high or low clustering coefficients. 
Imagine two target words (e.g. badge and log) that have the same number of neighbours. The 
target word, badge, with a higher proportion of neighbours that are also neighbours with each 
other is considered to have a higher clustering coefficient while log with a lower proportion 
of neighbours also being neighbours is one with a lower clustering coefficient. Such lists 




coefficients may produce a higher number of false memories versus lists with lower 
clustering coefficients.  
Lists with a higher clustering coefficient could also potentially have a more apparent 
theme versus a list with lower clustering coefficient. Following this understanding, we can 
imagine that participants might incorporate the strategy of recollection rejection and reduce 
misidentifying critical items on recall and recognition tests. To investigate this, future 
research could explore whether participants are able to identify the theme of the lists from 
these word lists and separate them through both theme identifiability and clustering 
coefficient. 
Another possible area to explore is whether we can establish phonological lists that 
can limit associative activation within its neighbours while emphasizing the central theme of 
these lists, similar to what Carneiro et al. (2012) did with theme identifiability and semantic 
lists. Through this, we can allow a more certain argument for fuzzy trace theory. As of now, 
the experiments in this study cannot fully separate between activation monitoring theory and 
fuzzy trace theory. Neighbours within a list now carry associative information as well as 
common theme, though it seems that it could be possible to have isolated lists as evident from 
the experiments of Huff and Hutchinson (2011). 
In addition, we also propose a more thorough investigation with the phonological 
associates used for this study in terms of what was discussed in the limitations section. 
Having a detailed comparison between the critical items, and producing the patterns from the 
way participants recall results may have a significant impact for the support for the effects of 
prior recall. It is speculated that if verbatim representations drive earlier responses for studied 
items on recall tasks, the reaction times for these studied items during the recognition phase 




studied items correspond to gist representations, then the reaction times for these items may 
be comparable to that for critical items that are recalled during recall.  
 In conclusion, the analyses of the effects of prior recall may be used as another 
measure to investigate the existence of false memories, and perhaps create a parsimonious 
theory to account for both semantic and phonological associates. The results from prior recall 
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List of Stimulus Words 
 
Note: Critical Items for the various lists are listed in Capital Letters 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 List 5 List 6 List 7 List 8 
CAT BUT BEAT BACK WELL BILL HIT SET 
Most confusable neighbours 
fat buff bat bag fell build heat cite 
that put beast rack dwell bowl fit sat 
cab boot feat pack shell kill lit net 
caught buck beef book will built wit wet 
cot hut bleat jack yell beer hat suit 
cut bud bead bake wool ill hurt cell 
kit bus cheat bass welch till his seat 
vat buzz bait black wheel bid him sought 
cap bug beach bath swell fill it met 
mat bunt bean sack wall bib chit sex 
Least confusable neighbours 
can bun eat bike wed boil pit fret 
coat bum bought bang smell gill knit jet 
cash bent beaten tack web bell hoot bet 
curt bust meat ban quell chill hip sweat 
kite bout beetle bar wedge dill hid vet 
cam gut street bash wail bile hint pet 
calf budge neat badge wealth bail hitch settle 
at mutt beam hack dell mill hilt asset 
catch nut bee batch where pill hiss sedge 











List 9 List 10 List 11 List 12 List 13 List 14 List 15 List 16 
SIN RIDE SEEK SAIL WROTE RIGHT RAIN POT 
Most confusable neighbours 
in wide sneak stale boat knight gain rot 
kin bide scene fail rate rice bane knot 
win glide see scale rove tight raid got 
fin ripe meek say note rhyme rave pop 
shin side seep hail root riot cane tot 
sing lied cheek mail robe might pain palm 
since tide chic snail row white rake plot 
chin fried cease save rope trite main lot 
gin tried leak soil goat rife ray posh 
din rude seize soul rouge light race dot 
Least confusable neighbours 
sieve road speak veil roam rat rage par 
thin guide peak sane rose bite ruin peat 
sewn bride seam ale tote fright brain shot 
soon rid creek rail moat rut drain pod 
sear read seal safe rout sprite grain what 
sign rise sock same roach slight wane jot 
spin rod soak sake vote rye run yacht 
sick hide suck tail throat rile chain putt 
skin pride sleek nail roast bright range part 















List 17 List 18 List 19 List 20 List 21 List 22 List 23 List 24 
PEER LOAN LAD FOR COAL DONE RIP REAL 
Most confusable neighbours 
year hone lag forth cone dine reap keel 
hear lobe had ford cold dung tip feel 
veer moan lack fort cull den pip veal 
dear flown dad far comb dune chip meal 
spear line pad soar code none nip eel 
leer loaf fad bore goal dawn rib peal 
fear known glad tore coke does rich deal 
rear loath lab forge hole don lip teal 
pair bone lap fair colt dunce rig heal 
tear load lamb foe cope dumb slip rule 
Least confusable neighbours 
near learn lead form toll dull ridge reef 
pick loathe sad your foal stun rim royal 
ping phone ladder fork role duck risk steal 
pitch low laid shore coil dug ring ream 
gear own lid fire cool fun snip reek 
ear alone land more curl gun rape reach 
pig lawn latch force coach down drip kneel 
shear lain add chore cove son zip really 
jeer lean lash foam pole dean grip wreathe 













Instructions for “Remember” or “Know” Responses (Adapted from Rajaram (1993)) 
Remember judgments: If your recognition of the word is accompanied by a conscious 
recollection of its prior occurrence in the study list, then press “R” on the keyboard. 
“Remember” is the ability to become consciously aware again of some aspect or 
aspects of what happened or what was experienced at the time the word was presented (e.g., 
aspect of the physical appearance of the word, or of something that happened in the room, or 
of what you were thinking or doing at that time). In other words, the “remembered” word 
should bring back to mind a particular association, image, or something more personal from 
the time of study, or something about its appearance or position (i.e., what came before or 
after that word). 
Know judgments: “Know” responses should be made when you recognize that the word 
was in the study list, but you cannot consciously recollect anything about its actual 
occurrence or what happened or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence. In other 
words, press “K” on the keyboard when you are certain of recognizing the words, but these 
words fail to evoke any specific conscious recollection from the study list. 
To further clarify the difference between these two judgments (i.e., “R” vs. “K”), 
here are a few examples. If someone asks for your name, you would typically respond in the 
“know” sense without becoming consciously aware of anything about a particular event or 
experience; however, when asked the last movie you saw, you would typically respond in the 





If you have any questions regarding these judgments, please ask the experimenter. Thank 
you. 
